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We present a restriction on the domain of individual preferences that is both
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a social choice rule that is continuous,
anonymous, and respects unanimity. The restriction is that the space of preferences
be contractible . Contractibility admits a straightforward intuitive explanation, and
is a generalisation of conditions such as single peakedness, value restrictedness and
limited agreement, which were earlier shown to be sufficient for majority voting to
be an acceptable rule . The only restriction on the number of individuals, is that it
be finite and at least 2. Journal of" Economic Literature Classification Numbers:
022, 024, 025.
I . INTRODUCTION
Ever since Black 13 ( and Arrow I I I first stated the social choice paradox
clearly, considerable energy has been devoted to discovering conditions
under which rational social choice is possible. This paper presents necessary
and sufficient conditions, extending earlier sufficient conditions of
Chichilnisky 1 9 1 .
One approach is to place restrictions on the types of preferences that can
be held by individuals : technically, this amounts to specifying restrictions on
the spaces of' preferences. An example widely used in other branches of
preference aggregation theory is the condition that preferences be
homothetic . (For applications of this condition, see Chipman 1141 and
Chichilnisky and Heal 1121 .) This is also called a restricted domain
approach . Another case is when any type of preference is in principle
allowed, but there has to be a certain interrelationship between the
preferences actually held by individuals. Existing conditions of these types
f8
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are single peakedness (Black 13 1) and value restrictedness (Sell and
Pattanaik 1241) . Conditions of this type are referred to as restricted profile
conditions .
"fhe sufficient conditions that have been given for rational outcomes under
majority voting are all essentially combinatorial in nature (see Sell and
Pattanaik 241) . We use a different approach from that used by earlier
writers, working within a framework introduced in Chichilnisky 191 . Because
this approach views preferences as a collection of smooth indill'crence
surfaces in a euclidean choice space, as is usual in the rest of economic
theory, it may be more intuitively appealing than the combinatorial
approach. Furthermore, it allows us to view the social choice problem as one
of demonstrating the existence of a suitable continuous function from tire
Cartesian product of the preference space into itself. This in turn enables one
to apply techniques which provide a characterization of the problem which is
more comprehensive and yet more economical than any that was previously
possible . It was demonstrated in Chichilnisky 191 that an essential element of
the social choice problem is that there is in general no map from the product
of the preference space with itself, into the preference space, that is
simultaneously continuous, anonymous and that respects unanimity .' '['his is
the version of the problem that we work with : we give conditions for the
existence of such a map. Note that the major difference form earlier work,
apart from the mathematical tools used, is the replacement of the somewhat
contentious axiom of independence of irrelevant alternatives by a more
natural condition of continuity .'
Using this topological framework, we present conditions that are necessary
and sufficient for the existence of continuous anonymous rules that respect
unanimity for any finite number of agents . The restricted domain condition is
that the space of preferences be contractible', i.e ., that it admits a defor-
mation to a point . The relationship between contractibility and aggregation
was first discussed in Chichilnisky 191, where the sufficiency of the condition
of contractibility was proven. The equivalent restriction on preference
profiles, is that the space of preference profiles be deformable onto the set of
unanimous profiles . Although there are in the literature a number of
conditions that are sufficient for the existence of specific social choice rules
(in particular, majority voting), this is to the best of our knowledge the first
statement of conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for a general
resolution of the social choice paradox.
It was also shown in Chichilnisky 161 that the standard version of the problem, involving
nondictatorship and the Pareto principle, has essentially the same mathematical structure .
' For a related exploration of continuity conditions in social choice problems, sec Coughlin
and Lin 1151 .
' A topological space is contractible wheh it can he continuously deformed to one of its
points, and therefore has the topological type of a point.
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Both interpretations of the result indicate that the social choice paradox
has only "trivial" solutions. The space of preferences being contractible
implies that up to a continuous deformation the space of preferences has
only one point. Similarly, when considering the space of preference profiles,
the condition is that the admissible space of profiles consists only of
unanimous profiles up to a continuous deformation . The fact that only trivial
solutions exist is consistent with the finding that for choice spaces of
dimension at least 2, the single peakedness condition of Black 131 implies
that all preferences are essentially identical, as shown in Kramer 1201 .
We also demonstrate here that if the choice space is infinite dimensional
and a Hilbert space, even with finitely many voters it is alwavs possible with
unrestricted domains to construct a continuous anonymous social choice rule
which respects unanimity. This possibility theorem is clearly not robust,
since for a choice space of any finite dimension, no matter how large, the
usual impossibility theorem for finitely many voters holds. The fact that a
possibility theorem holds when the dimension of the space is infinite, but
does not for any finite dimension, is reminiscent of the fact that with "a finite-
dimensional choice space, it is possible to construct a social choice rule
when the number of agents is infinite, whereas once again the usual
impossibility results hold for any finite set of agents . This fact was first
noted by Fishburn 1171, and later by Brown 141, and Kirman and
Sonderman 1191 : these results were extended to continuous anonymous rules
in Chichilnisky and Heal 1131 .
It is natural to inquire into the relationship between our sets of necessary
and sufficient conditions, and earlier sufficient conditions (such as those of
Sen and Pattanaik 1241) for a rational outcome under majority rule, since
these rules satisfy the anonymity condition and respect unanimity . In fact,
such a comparison is not straightforward. This is because our conditions
apply to the existence of social choice rules in general, whereas those earlier
conditions relate only to majority rules. Furthermore, here we require that a
social choice rule be continuous, so that small changes in the preferences (or
a small error in the reporting of preferences) leads only to small changes in
the outcome. Continuity was not required in the earlier literature, indeed,
their framework did not permit the discussion of such a condition. Now it
was shown in Chichilnisky 1101 that even rather weak forms of majority
rules (decisive majorities) are in general not continuous, so that the rules for
which the earlier conditions were devised, do not in fact meet our
assumptions . However, it is clear that our conditions are necessary for the
existence of satisfactory continuous majority rules, and in spite of the
differences in approach some of the earlier conditions appear to be special
cases of ours . As a demonstration of this is rather complex, we leave it to a
separate paper.
It seems useful to discuss briefly the applicability of the necessary and
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sufficient conditions given here, to the version of' the social choice paradox
involving nondictatorship and the Pareto condition .
The continuity assumption, as mentioned, takes the role of the axiom of'
independence of irrelevant alternatives . The condition of respect ol'unanimity
that we require (that if all preferences are identical over all choices, then the
social preference is the same as that of the individuals), is clearly weaker
than the Pareto condition, whereas the anonymity condition that we require
is stronger then the nondictatorship condition. Anonymity requires complete
symmetry in the treatment of voters, whereas nondictatorship merely
eliminates the most extreme forms of asymmetry. Therefore, the necessary
and sufficient conditions that we give here may not apply to the existence of'
a continuous Pareto nondictatorial social choice rule, although we conjecture
in view of the results of Chichilnisky 161 that this is the case under certain
regularity conditions.
In the next section, we introduce the framework within which we shall be
working and present the relevant notation and definitions. In Section 3, we
discuss in intuitive terms the main results of the paper, giving examples both
of preference domains that are contractible, and of the type of social choice
rule then admitted . The fourth and final section contains a formal statement
of the theorems ; some of the proofs are in the Appendix.
2 . NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
Let Y be the choice space, such as a unit cube in R", denoted I", or the
positive orthant of R", R" . Since our framework is topological, it suffices to
consider a space which is homeomorphic to I" : to simplify matters we
choose the closed unit ball B", a manifold with boundary.
A preference p on Y is a family of smooth indifference surfaces : formally,
it is defined by giving for each choice y in Y a preferred direction, or,
equivalently, the normal to the indifference surface at y, a vector denoted
p()'). As is usual in social choice theory (e.g ., Arrow I 11), preferences are
ordinal, and intensities of preferences are not considered . We therefore
normalize the vector fields that give our preferences to be of unit length, i .e .,
II p(j, )II = I for all y. ° A preference is thus a map y -i p(y) from choices 1,
into the tangent space of Y, T(Y), such that for each y, p(y) is in the tangent
space of Y at the choice y. Such a map is called a t7eclor field on Y. We
topologize the spaces Y and T(Y) as usual, and we assume that the
The fact that the vector field can be normalized to be of unit length, implies that it is
nowhere zero in the interior of the choice space. In the remark following Corollary 2 below,
we indicate how our results can be extended to certain spaces of preferences which admit
satiation . A general discussion of social choice problems with vanishing gradients within (lie
present framework is contained in Chichilnisky 171 .
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preferences are defined by continuously diflcrentiable locally integrable
vector fields, i .e ., that p(j,) is locally the gradient of' a real-valued utility
function on Y. The space P of all such locally integrable preferences is
characterized within the space of all C' vector fields on Y, V(Y), by the
Frobenius integrability conditions ; V(Y) is given the C' topology." The
Frobenius conditions and the normalization assumption Il p()')Il = I are both
closed conditions, so that the space P endowed with the topology inherited
from V(Y) is a complete space since it is a closed subspace of the space of
vector fields V(Y). The space V(Y) is infinite dimensional, and the space P
contains infinite-dimensional manifolds ; this is shown in Chichilnisky 15 1 .
We assume that there are k voters indexed by i = I , . . ., k . k is finite . A
profile of k voters' preferences is given by a sequence p; + = (p I , P21 . . ., PJ.
We shall denote the space of profiles L ; this is a subset of the product of the
space P with itself k times. We denote this product space XP;P; denotes the
space of preferences of the ith voter and thus P, = P for all i, so that
XP; = XP.
A social aggregation rule or social choice rule is a map from profiles to
social preferences in P. Therefore,
0 :L=XP-+P.
Note that the social choice rule 0 has as its arguments preferences p ;, which
are vector fields over the entire choice space. It is not assumed to act
"pointwise" by combining at each choice the individual preferences at that
choice to give a social preference at that choice. The social preference at a
point j, may in principle depend on individual preferences over their entire
domain. Of course, "pointwise" rules come within the scope of our results .
A social choice rule 0 is said to be anonymous if for any permutation
in I -_ in, j of the set of integers ; 1, . .., k 1,
O(PI I P2, . . .,Pk) = O(P.,I . . .I P.,)-
"The outcome of the social choice rule thus depends only on the set of
preferences of the individuals, and not on who holds which preference . This
is an equal treatment condition : it implies that there is no one individual
whose preference determines the social choice, so that in particular the rule
` We give V the C' topology in order to obtain a nice topological structure on V; any
topology on V that restricted to linear preferences coincides with the convergence of vectors in
R", will also give our result .
' The Frobenius integrability conditions are usually given by a set of partial differential
equations . They are necessary (but not sufficient) for a vector field to be the gradient of a
real valued function . For a discussion of these conditions see, for instance, Debreu 1161 .
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is nondictatorial . The social choice rule is said to respect unanimity il'
0(p, P,---, P) = P,
0 : XP -+ P,
for all p E P,
i.e ., if all individuals have identical preferences over all choices, then the
social choice rule yields that preference as an outcome. This is clearly a very
natural requirement. Note that this does not imply that if all individuals
prefer alternative x to alternative j, , then society prefers x to v. It is therefore
weaker than the Pareto condition. It was shown in Chichilnisky 191 that with
unrestricted domains of preferences there is no social choice rule 0 :
which is simultaneously continuous, anonymous, and respects unanimity .
The space XP has the natural product topology inherited from that of the
space P, and continuity of the social choice rule 0 is defined with respect to
this topology on XP. Continuity of the rule 0 and of the preferences implies
that the social preference at a point v E Y is continuous in profiles and
choices. Although we are not requiring the axiom of independence of
irrelevant alternatives, these continuity properties will ensure that a social
choice rule satisfies a related global independence condition, see Chichilnisky
and flea[ 1131 .
A topological space X is contractible if there exists a continuous function ./
.
and a point xo E X with
such that
and
f X X 10, 1 1, X,
f(X, I ) = x, for all x E X,
AX, 0) = xo , for all x E X.
In more intuitive terms, a contractible space is one that has no "holes" in
it, and can consequently be contracted continuously through itself into one of
its points . Any convex space is contractible, as is the unit disk ; the circle is
not contractible, nor is the torus.
A topological space X is connected when it does not contain two subsets f1
and B such that both A and B are open and closed in X, A (1 B --- 0, and
X =A U B. Y c X is called a connected component of X if Y is connected,
and there is no connected subset Z of X such that Y (-F Z.
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3. DISCUSSION AND EXAMPLES
We shall give below two necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence of a social choice rule, one relating to properties of spaces of
profiles, and the other to domain restrictions . In both cases, the essential
point is that the domain of individual preferences, P, should be contractible .
In this case, and only in this case, we can always construct for any finite
number of voters a social choice rule which is continuous, anonymous, and
respects unanimity . In this section, we discuss in general and intuitive terms
the interpretation of these results, and illustrate them with particular
examples of contractible domains and of the admissible social choice rules.
(For further illustrations of the concept of contractibility and of its
relationship with other more familiar concepts such as convexity, see Heal
1181 .)
In Theorem 1 below, we follow the restricted domain approach, and show
that a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a social choice
rule for any finite number of voters is that the space of preferences be
contractible . Equivalently, we show in Corollary 1 that if attention is
directed to the study of spaces of preference profiles, the necessary and
sufficient condition is that the profile space admits a retraction' to the
preference space.
Consider first the restricted domain condition. In this case, the condition is
that the space of preferences be contractible, which means that it can be
continuously deformed to a point. A point represents a single preference, so
this is a requirement that the preferences in the space of preferences are
sufficiently similar that they can all be simultaneously continuously
deformed to a single preference . Therefore, this is a requirement of unanimity
up to a continuous deformation.
Next consider the condition on profiles and its implication that the profile
space and the preference space be of the same topological type . This means
that one can be continuously deformed into another, i.e ., that the set of all
possible profiles can be continuously deformed into the set of all possible
preferences. Thus any element of the former, i.e ., any profile, can be
continuously deformed into an object in the latter, a single preference . In
other words, within any admissible profile there must be sufficient agreement
that the preferences in that profile can be continuously deformed into one
single preference . This is again a requirement of unanimity up to a
continuous deformation in any admissible profile.
We see then that our two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions are in
essence the same. In both cases, what is required is that any preference
' A retraction r from X onto a subset A (- X is a continuous reap r: X , A that when
restricted to A is the identity . Intuitively, r pulls X onto A c h' .
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profile that may arise, exhibits sufficient agreement that the preferences in it
can be continuously deformed to a single preference . What one might cull
"topological unanintilt~" is a general necessart, and sulJicieni conclilion for
the existence of appropriate aggregation rules with any finite number of
agents .
It should of course be emphasized that "topological unanimity" is much
weaker than unanimity . A set may be very large and still be continuously
deformable to a point-for example, a cone in Euclidean n space is contrac-
tible. The role of the "topological unanimity" condition is to limit the types
of disagreement or of variation in preferences that can be accepted. The
examples below make this point clear. Limiting the nature and extent of
possible disagreement is clearly the effect of many of the conditions already
cited in the literature as sufficient for a rational outcome under majority
voting-for example, single peakedness, limited agreement, and valued
restriction. Kramer 120) explores the implications of these conditions, and
shows how they are limiting the range of variation or disagreement in
preferences. Indeed, he shows that for a choice space of dimension at least
three, single peakedness implies unanimity, and thus that the space of'
preferences is a point.
It is interesting to relate these conclusions to a remark made by Arrow 11,
p. 83 1 . Speaking of Black's single-peakedness condition, he commented that
it did at least "show that the condition of unanimity is mathematically
unnecessary for the existence of a social welfare function ." Kramer's result
shows that in the case of single peakedness, this optimism was misplaced.
More generally, our results show that a revised and greatly weakened
concept of unanimity provides a necessary and sufficient condition .
We now turn to a discussion of the implications of Theorem I, which
gives contractibility as a necessary and sufficient restriction on the
preference domain . This tells us that restrictions must be placed on the types
of preference admitted which ensure that the space of preferences is
topologically trivial, i .e ., that it has the topological characteristics of a point .
To clarify this, we consider its implications when we restrict our attention to
preferences at one choice.
Within our framework, if we restrict our attention to preferences at a
choice y in Y, then a preference is fully characterized by the normalized
gradient vector p;(1') giving individual is preferred direction at y. If' there are
no restrictions on individual preferences, then this normalized gradient vector
may take any direction, so the set of possible preferences at the point ). is
isomorphic to the set of points on the unit sphere centered at j, . This is,
denoted by S" ', (lie (n- I)-dimensional sphere in R". A restriction on
individual preferences now takes the form of the specification of' a subset of
S" ' within which the normalized gradient vector must lie.
If there is no restriction on individual preferences, then the space of
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individual preferences at a point is S" ', and is therefore not contractible .
Hence, no social choice rule will exist. A listing of individual preferences at
a point is then an element of the product of the sphere S" -' with itself k
times.
11', however, there is a convex cone of directions C, no matter how small,
which no agent may have as most preferred directions, then the space of
preferences becomes the sphere S" ' minus its intersection with a cone,
which is contractible . In this case, a social choice rule exists . It should be
noted that the size of the cone C of excluded directions (measured for
instance in euclidean distance) is a property which is not invariant under
different units of measurement. It is therefore desirable that the results do not
depend on the size of such cones, as, indeed, they do not.
The above gives a sufficient condition for the contractibility of the space
of' preferences at each choice. If this condition holds at every choice, and if
the contraction to be applied at each point varies continuously with that
point, and satisfies certain other regularity conditions, then the overall space
of preferences P will be contractible . In intuitive terms, what is required to
move from local to global contractibility is that the cone of directions
excluded at any point should vary "smoothly" with that point, as shown in
Fig. 1 .
We give some simple examples to illustrate this idea .
EXAMPLE I . If the excluded directions comprise the same convex cone
at every point in the choice space, then the space of preferences is contrac-
tible. Thus if there is some direction such that everyone agrees that their
most preferred direction is bounded away from this, and all other directions
are permitted, a social choice rule exists . In particular, if the space of
preferences consists of all monotone and convex preferences, then a social
choice rule exists . This appears at first sight to cover the case of the usual
general equilibrium model, but in fact this is not true . Under the usual
Fu: . I . Cones of' excluded directions at points x, , X2 I"' .
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assumptions, the relevant space over which social choices have to be made in
this model, is the generalised Edgeworth box, on which individual
preferences may be opposed, and are clearly not a monotone family .
Note that while Arrow's version of the social choice paradox (Arrow I I )
cannot be resolved with convex monotone preferences over (lie choice space
B", it can be resolved if preferences are convex and monotone over every
triple of alternatives . The axiom of independence makes such a triple the
basic unit in Arrow's framework : see Chichilnisky 17 1 .
EXAMPLE 2 . Suppose that preferences are linear, so that their gradients
are constant and the space of preferences is identical with the sphere . Then in
this case, the space of preferences is contractible if it consists of all linear
preferences that are bounded away from one preference .
EXAMPLE 3. Consider the case where there are a finite number of agents,
but the choice space for each is a Hilbert space of countable infnile
dimension . e The space of linear preferences is then the unit sphere which in
such spaces is homeomorphic to the whole space (see Bessaga and
Pelczynski 12, Corollary 5 .1, p. 1091, and Kuiper 1211). In particular, it is
contractible and furthermore, it is also homeomorphic to a convex set, i .e ., it
is in a one to one bicontinuous correspondence with a convex set. Note first
that Theorem 1 applies because the sphere in a Hilbert space is a parafinite
CW complex.' In fact, this case is particularly simple : we can always
construct a continuous anonymous social choice rule that respects unanimity
simply by taking convex addition composed with the homeomorphism, as
shown below.
The case of a choice space of countably infinite dimension, is one that has
not previously been noted, and therefore merits some further comment. The
result quoted on the contractibility of the unit sphere in Hilbert spaces is in
fact counterintuitive and it is the basis for the resolution of the paradox in
these cases.
It is also counterintuitive to have a possibility result on1v when the
dimension of the choice space is infinite-we noted a similarly counterin-
tuitive result in the case of infinitely many agents . It is clear that any
continuous anonymous and unanimous social choice rule (which exists in the
infinite-dimensional case) must in general violate one of' these three
conditions when restricted to any finite-dimensional subspace . In particular,
they must violate anonymity or respect of unanimity, as the restriction will
surely be continuous .
" A Hilbert space is a complete normed linear vector space with in inner prodsact . 'Ilse
space 1, of all sequences .r= Ix  I of scalars for which jjxII == IV,,' (x  )' I' ~ is liui1e, is an
example of a Hilbert space when given the inner product (x,
v This is defined in Section 4 below.
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Although this result on infinite-dimensional spaces is counterintuitive, it is
certainly not without economic interest . There are many economiL%object-,
between which social choices have to be made, which are naturally of infinite
dimension . Examples are optimal growth programmes, optimal resource
depletion profiles, and optimal income tax schedules . All of these are most
naturally modelled as infinite-dimensional objects, so that the fact that the
social choice problem can be resolved in the infinite-dimensional case is of
considerable relevance for growth theory and tax theory .
EXAMPLE 4. It should be emphasized that a contractible preference
space need not be constructed by restricting the set of directions that
preference gradients can take at each choice . A construction in Chichilnisky
1 5 1 considers preference families such that there is a one-dimensional neat"'
submanifold of the choice space along which all members of the family are
increasing . It is shown there that such families are contractible, even though
there may be regions of the choice space at which all possible gradients are
assumed . Figure 2 illustrates this construction : the curve ab is a one-
dimensional neat submanifold of the unit cube along which all the
preferences are increasing .
EXAMPLE 5 . It may be helpful, finally, to give examples of pre-
ference spaces which are not contractible. One is the whole space P (see
b
Fr(;. 2 . ah is a neat one dimensional submanifold of the choice space. A family of
preferences is contractible if all members are increasing along ah.
"' A neat submanil'old H of a manifold A is a submanifold such that iJR c -- i~A, i.e ., the
boundaries of N arc contained in those of' ;l .
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t)
Fm . 1. A two-s(age retraction of the disk D onto P.
Chichilnisky 190) . It is also shown in Chichilnisky I l I I that under standard
assumptions the space of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities over a finite
set of alternatives, is not a contractible space.
Finally, we give an example of the kind of social choice rule which our
theorems admit . As the sufficiency proof of Theorem I will indicate, convex
averaging rules, or deformations of these, are admitted. Theorem 2 shows
that, up to a continuous deformation, only such rules are admitted, so that
we have in fact a complete characterization of admissible rules .
Suppose that preferences are linear, and the choice space two-dimensional .
With no domain restriction, therefore, P is S', the unit circle in R'. Now
suppose that there is in fact a domain restriction to the effect that no
individual preference may have a normal lying in the southwest quadrant,
i .e ., no preference can be decreasing on all axes . The admissible domain of'
preferences is therefore the circle S' minus its intersection with the negative
orthant : it is clearly contractible, though not convex. This domain is,
however, a retract" of a convex set-for example, of the unit disk !)' whose
boundary is S' . Figure 3 illustrates a retraction r: D -+ P. a and b are the
ends of P. First the negative orthant of the disk is retracted onto acb, then
acb is "pulled back" onto P. This can clearly be arranged so that the
composition of the two operations leaves points in P unmoved, as required
by a retraction .
We can now define the following social choice rule . Consider a k-tuple of'
preferences p . ,. .., pk with p; E P. Firstly, compute the mean,
P = P1 .
" A is a retract of B if there is a retraction (see note 7) of B onto A . See also the definition
in Section 4 below.
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If p E P, then p is the social preference . Otherwise, p will certainly be in U' .
In this case, apply to p the retraction r defined above, leading to a point in f.
This is now the social preference .
Note that in the example given here, P is not only a retraction of a convex
set : it is homeomorphic to a convex set (namely, a closed connected interval
of R'). In this case we could in fact have used the much simpler construction
of averaging in the convex set, and composing this with the inverse of the
homeomorphism . However, not all contractible spaces are homeomorphic to
convex sets, so that this argument cannot be used in the proof of Theorem I .
4. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDI'T'IONS
In this section we give formal statements of the theorems alluded to above.
Some of the proofs are also given here, with the remainder in the Appendix .
First, however, we need to introduce some further topological terms and
concepts .
In the following, the space of preferences, denoted by P, is assumed to be
a parafinite CW complex with finitely many connected components, whose
convex hull k(P) has the same characteristics . A CW complex is a
topological space that can be constructed inductively by adding n-cells is an
appropriate fashion ; an n-cell is homeomorphic to an n disk in R" (see
Spanier 125, p. 4011). We call a CW complex parafinite when it has a finite
number of cells of each dimension n > 0. In Corollary 2 below it is shown
that the connectedness of the space is not essential, as analogous results
follow if the space is not connected, but each connected component is a
parafinite CW complex with the above properties .
This is a very general specification ; it includes the case where P is the nth
sphere S", when P is an n-dimensional smooth manifold, or when P is a
polyhedron, or any space homeomorphic to a polyhedron . Certain infinite
dimensional spaces of preferences are also included, such as the unit sphere
in a Hilbert space as in Example 3. This can be constructed by the inductive
process of adding two n-cells to S' ' for all n > 2, and taking the union.
This condition that the space of preferences be a parafinite CW complex is
used in the proof of Theorem I below. In particular, being a CW complex is
required to ensure that the space of preferences, which is connected and has
all homotopy groups zero, will be contractible, see, e.g ., Spanier 125,
7 .6.241." This may not be true with certain pathological spaces such as a
Corollary 24, Chapter 7, Section 6, of Spanier 1251 proves that a map between CII'
complex is a weak homcriopy equivalence if and only if it is a homotopy equivalence. Ily
dclmition of a weak homcriopy equivalence (Spanier 125, p.404 1, the constant mapf: I' , p ,
where P is (lie space of preferences and p is a point in P, will induce a one to one correspon
dcnce between patli components of P and of 1p  l , and an isomorphism in the homotopy
such that
and
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"double comb" space, see, e.g ., Maunder 123, No. 7.5, p . 3011 . While our
proof does not apply to such spaces, it is an open question whether a
noncontractible preference space with zero homology may admit a well
behaved social choice rule .
A space A is said to be a deformation of X, or, equivalently, X is dcfor-
mable into A, if there exists a continuous map
D:XX 10, 11 -+X,
D(x,0)=xdx in X,
D(X, 1) =A .
A space is contractible if it is deformable into one of its points. A retraction
r from X onto A c X is a continuous map r: X - " A that restricted to A is the
identity, i.e ., r/A = id ., . In this case, the space A is said to be a retract of X.
The space A is a deformation retract of X if A is a deformation and a retract
of X.
Consider two continuous maps f, g from a topological space X into
another Y. We say that f and g are homotopic if there exists a continuous
maps G such that
G:XX10,11 -4Y,
G(x, 0) =f(x) for x in X,
G(x, 1) = g(x) for all x in X.
f and g are thus homotopic if there is a continuously parametrised family of
maps, parametrised by the unit interval, linking f and g. Intuitively, the map
f can be continuously deformed into g. We shall say that two social choice
rules are equivalent if they are homotopic as maps.
In this section, we state two results giving necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of a continuous, anonymous social choice rule
that respects unanimity for any finite number k of voters, k > 2. Theorem I
extends the results in Chichilnisky 19 1 to show that contractibility is a
necessary as well as sufficient condition . Only the proof of sufficiency in
groups nq(P) and n(p ) for all q >, I, if P is path connected and all homotopy groups of P.
(n,(P)Vi) are zero . 'therefore, Corollary 24 implies that when 1' is a CIV complex with
n,(1') - () for all i, P is homotopically equivalent to po, and, therefore, P is contractible . For
another proof that a CW complex with all its homotopy groups zero is contractible, see
Maunder 123, p. 329, Corollary 8 .3.111 .
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Theorem I is given in this section, as this is relatively nontechnical. The
remaining proofs are given in the Appendix . The sufficiency proof in
Theorem I provides a characterisation of the kind of rule admitted .
In addition, we prove a theorem which establishes that up to a continuous
deformation, all the continuous, anonymous social choice rules which respect
unanimity (which exist only when the preference space is contractible) are
identical to an appropriate generalisation of the example discussed in
Section 3 . That is to say, they are homotopic to rules constructed by convex
averaging on a convex space, and then composing this operation with one
which sends the convex space into the contractible space.
T111?OKl?M I . Let the space of preference profiles be the k-fold Cartesian
product of the space of preferences, L = XP, so that all logicallt, possible
combinations of preferences are admitted. Then a necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of a social choice rule which is continuous,
anonymous, and respects unanimity for all k > 2 is that the space of
preferences P be contractible, i.e ., that up to a continuous deformation, all
preferences are identical .
Proof. Let P be a contractible space, Pc V(Y). Suppose first that P is
also convex . By definition, in a convex space averaging is always possible. It
follows immediately that a continuous anonymous rule 0 respecting
unanimity exists, for instance
V pi,
1
k ;,
where L denotes the vector sum in the space of C' vector Gelds V(Y)
induced by summing vectors at each point. The social preference is just the
mean of the individual preferences. In fact we shall now show that, even if P
is not convex, a similar construction can still be used. Note first that since P
is a contractible CW complex, it is' therefore a retract of the convex set k(P),
because the identity map
can always in this case be extended to a continuous map r : k(P) --+ P by
results of obstruction theory (see, e.g ., Spanier 125, Chapt. 8, 8.4.11) .
Therefore, since r extends i, r/P = id,, . By definition, r is therefore a
retraction from k(P) onto P. It follows that the composite map
,~ I ,
Y'(pI,-,pk) = r ° (k- pr)
RESOLUTION OF ME SOCIAL CIIOICE PARADOX
defines a continuous anonymous rule that respects unanimity . Therefore, to
construct the social preferences, we perform an averaging operation on the
convex space of which P is a retract, and then compose this with the
retraction on P. This completes the proof of sufficiency . The proof of'
necessity is given in the Appendix .
We shall now give a characterization of contractible spaces of preferences.
COROLLARY I . A necessary and sufficient condition for the space of'
preferences P to be contractible is that the space of preference profiles
L = XP admits a deformation retract onto the space of unanimous profiles .
Therefore, with restricted domains, a solution exists for all k > 2 if and orlly
if all preferences profiles are topologically equivalent to unanimous profiles .
The proof of this corollary is given in the Appendix .
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Let I the preference space P be contractible . Then an:r
continuous anonymous social choice rule that respects unanimitil, Is
equivalent to a rulef constructed as follows. Take a convex space C of which
P is a retract, with r the retraction, r : C -+ P . Then define a convex averaging
rule on C, and let f be the composition of this with r .
Proof. The existence of a convex space C and a retraction r : C - P is
assured by the arguments in the proof of sufficiency in Theorem I . These
arguments also demonstrate that there always exists at least one continuous
anonymous social choice rule that respects unanimity and is constructed as
specified in the theorem. We therefore only have to prove that any other such
rule is homotopic to this . But this is an immediate consequence of the
following observation :
Let X and Y be two topological spaces, with Y contractible . Then any two
continuous functions from X to Y are homotopic, see Spanier (25, 1 .3 .7 1 .
The next corollary extends the above results, and in particular those of'
Theorem I, to disconnected spaces of preferences. We assume now that each
connected component of the space of preferences is a parafinite CW
complex, and that P has at most finitely many components .
COROLLARY 2. Let the space of preference profiles be the k -fold
Cartesian product of the space P of preferences . Then a necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of a social choice rule which is
continuous, anonymous, and respects unanimity for all k > 2, is that each
connected component of P be contractible .
We prove necessity first. Let 0 : Pk _ P satisfy all the conditions, then IF C
is a connected component of P, continuity and respect unanimity imply 610
maps 0 into C. Since 0/Ck obviously is a continuous anonymous map
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respecting unanimity, and C is a connected parafinite CW complex,
'theorem I applies, and C must be contractible .
Next we prove sufficiency . Let P= U C,,, C the connected components
of P. For each C,,, we can define a continuous map ~ : (C)" - C respecting
unanimity and anonymity, by Theorem l, since C is contractible .
Consider now any profile (p,, ..., pk) E Pk . If all p;'s are in one component,
say (' , then define OP,,. .., Pk ) = OAP, ,.. ., Pk) " If instead, there exist in the
profile (p, ,. . ., pk) preferences which belong to different components, then
define = ' where a = mina a E C11i ;~(P~ . . . . . Pk) ~~.(PI,. ..,Pk), ( ,, . . ., k)1 Pi ; Pi = Pi
if p; E C , and p, = p. if p; (t C . This rule satisfies all conditions.
Remark . Note that Corollary 2 enables us to apply Theorem 1 to certain
spaces of preferences which admit satiation . For example, the space of linear
preferences on R", including the preference which is indifferent between all
alternatives, can be represented as the union of the unit sphere in R" and the
origin . For further examples of spaces of preferences admitting satiation
which come within this framework, see Chichilnisky 17 1 .
The strategy of the proof is to show that the conditions of anonymity and
unanimity together imply that any element of any homotopy group of P is
divisible by any arbitrary integer to yield a member of the group, thus
implying that all such elements are zero. Because P is a CW complex, the
fact that all homotopy groups are zero is then shown to imply that P is con-
tractible.
Let 0 : Pk --+ P be a continuous anonymous social choice rule respecting
unanimity. 0 defines a map 0* at the homotopy level ; for each i > l, letting
77 i(P) be the ith homotopy group of P,
APPENDIX : PROOF OF THE NECESSITY OF
CONTRACTIBILITY IN THEOREM I
0 * : n;((P)k ) - ni(p).
Consider first the case where i > 2. Then n,(P) is always abelian (see, e.g .,
Spanier 125, p. 372, lines I to 3 1) . Furthermore, if i is the smallest integer
with n;(P) -A 0, then by the Hurewicz Isomorphism Theorem (Spanier 125,
7 .5.5 ., p. 398 1), n,(P) is isomorphic to N,(P), the ith singular homology
group of' P. Therefore, in particular, n,(P) is finitely generated, because P has
a finite number of cells in each dimension, being parafinite by assumption .
Being a finitely generated abelian group, n,(P) is therefore a direct sum of
a linite number of infinite cyclical groups isomorphic to the integers, and of
cyclical groups of finite prime order, these latter denoted by Z,,,, p; prime
numbers (Lederman 121, p. 92, p. 120, Definition 7, and p. 121,
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Proposition 17 1) . The direct sum of the infinite cyclical groups generates the
free part of np'); the direct sum of the rest its torsion T(n;(P)), where
T(n I(P)) = Ix E n,(P) : mx = 0 for some integer m > 11 .
Note also that n,((P)k )) is isomorphic to the product of k copies of n;(P),
i.e .,
k
n,((P) k ) =' X )Ti(p)
i
(see, e.g ., Spanier 125, p. 419, No. 5 of B 1). Now, consider x a generator in
the free part of n,(P) . Then (x, x, . . ., x) E n;((P) k ) . Because of the condition of
respect of unanimity,
0 * (x, x, . .., x) = x. (1)
Also, if e is the identity element in the group n,(P), since 0* is a group
homomorphism, (i .e ., 0* is "linear" in the group operation denoted 1- ),
0*(x,x,. ..,x)=0*I(x,e, . . .,e)t (e, x,e, . . .,e)t . . . t (e,e, . ..,e,x)I
=0*(x,e,...,e)t0*(e,x, . . .,e,e)t . . .
t 0* (e, e, . . ., e, x), (2)
since (x, x, . . ., x) = (x, e, . . ., e) t (e, x, e, . . ., e) t . . . t (e, e, . . ., e, x) . By the
symmetry condition, all factors in the last expression of (2) are identical,
say, to 0*(x, e, . . ., e). It follows from (I) and (2) that
x = k0*(x, e, . . ., e) = ky, where y = 0*(x, e, . . ., e) E n;(P), (3)
because n,(P) is abelian . Since x is a generator in the free part of 7r;(P), x
generates a group which is isomorphic to the integers . Since k is any
arbitrarily chosen natural number, it follows that x = 0, because only 0 can
be divided by any integer k . This implies that all generators in the free part
of n,(P) are zero, i.e., n;(P) has no free part .
Now consider x a generator in the torsion part of n;(P), T(n,(P)). Then
x E ZP,, for some p, . However, from (3), x = ky, for any k E Z. It follows
that Z., is zero for all p,, which implies that T(n;(P)) = 0 also . Since n;(I')
has no torsion and no free part, it is the zero group, for all i > 2.
In the case i = I, note that when n,(P) is abelian, then the group n,(P) is
isomorphic to 11,(P) (see, e.g ., Spanier 125, remarks at top of p . 3911) . It
follows that when n,(P) is shown to be abelian, the rest of the proof above
applies for the case i = 1, since 11,(P) is a finitely generated abelian group.
Therefore we show next that the existence of the map 0 implies immediately
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that n,(P) is abelian. Note that for any two elements .r and j, in n,(P,,
and
for any k > I, (2) and (3) imply
.r 1- .I . = ko*(x, e, . . ., e) t ko *(e,y, e, ..., e) (4)
-_ 0*(kx, kj , , e, . . ., e) because 0* is a group homomorphism.
But by the symmetry condition on 0,
0*(kx,ky,e,...,e)=0*(kv,kx,e, . ..,e)=vtx. (5)
Therefore (4) and (5) imply x ty=y t x, so that n,(P) is abelian. This
completes the proof that n,(P) = 0 for all i > 1 .
Since P is a connected CW complex and n;(P) = 0 for all i > 1, P must be
contractible (see, e.g ., Spanier (25, 7.6.24, p. 405 1, and footnote 12 of this
paper), completing the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1 . Assume first that L =XP admits P as a defor-
mation retract. It follows from Spanier 125, p. 33, Theorem 13 1, that XP and
P have the same homotopy type. Hence
n;(P) - n,(XP) for i > I .
However, by Spanier (25, p.419, No. 5 of B1, there is an isomorphism
k
Therefore, for all i > l
n,(XP) = X nr(P)
n;(P) - 0.
for all i > 0.
Since P is connected and is a CW complex this implies that P is contrac-
tible (see Spanier 125, p. 405, 7.6.24 1 and footnote 12 of this paper).
This completes the proof of sufficiency .
Assume now that P is contractible . It follows that there exists a defor-
mation retract R from P into a fixed preference p in P (Spanier 125, p. 29 1) .
Consider now the set
Q= I(P,Po,...,Po):PE PI .
The deformation retract induced by R on the last k - I components of XP
maps ,1'P into Q. Since Q is homeomorphic to P this completes the proof of
necessity .
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